

retiring at the end of the year. In the event the parking enforcement unit remains within the police department, the parking supervisor position would continue to oversee important community safety issues. As CCPD has few supervisory positions in the civilian promotional ladder, CPSM recommends this position be filled as soon as possible. With advance notice, the department is able to potentially cross-train the new supervisor with the outgoing parking supervisor.

Traffic Recommendations:

- Add language in the Watches, Schedules, and Rotation policy to describe the selection process to the Traffic Division. (Recommendation No. 22.)
- Immediately implement motorcycle safety and skills training at least annually. (Recommendation No. 23.)
- Create a system to track citizen complaints regarding traffic issues using the CAD/RMS system or other software and generate a monthly report for the Traffic sergeant to review and share with Traffic as well as Patrol personnel. (Recommendation No. 24.)
- Consider adding two FTE CSO positions for automated photo enforcement and redeploy the two sworn officers now assigned to automated photo enforcement to patrol duties. (Recommendation No. 25.)
- Adopt a performance management approach (using traffic data to drive deployment and enforcement decisions) toward traffic accidents and injuries. (Recommendation No. 26.)
- Consider adding one FTE CSO position in Traffic to handle traffic collision investigations, which would allow a sworn position in Traffic to be redeployed. (Recommendation No. 27.)
- Transfer the animal services program to the city's Code Enforcement Department. (Recommendation No. 28.)
- Assign parking meter collection responsibilities to the finance or public works department. (Recommendation No. 29.)
- Consider transitioning to phone app digital parking meters as meters are replaced (Recommendation No. 30.)
- Include civilian positions in the department's LEFTA training system to track and document training. (Recommendation No. 31.)
- Include the civilian supervisor in the monthly meetings with the school district. (Recommendation No. 32.)
- Fill the pending parking supervisor vacancy as soon as possible. (Recommendation No. 33.)

JAIL SECTION

The Culver City Police Department operates a Type I Jail Facility. As defined by Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations (CCR), a Type I Jail Facility is a local detention facility used for the detention of persons for not more than 96 hours, excluding holidays, after booking. Such a Type I facility may also detain persons on court order either for their own safekeeping or who are sentenced to a city jail as an inmate worker. A Type I Jail Facility may also house inmate workers sentenced to the county jail provided such placement in the facility is made on a voluntary basis on the part of the inmate. As of this writing, CCPD does not currently house inmates by court order or utilize inmate workers.

Prisoners booked in the facility are processed in accordance with CCPD policy. They are medically screened utilizing the Los Angeles County Unified Arrestee Medical Screening Form. Male prisoners are classified for housing according to the jail's classification plan by the on-duty jailer. They are provided the required bedding, meal, and phone calls. By the 96-hour limit, CCPD prisoners are released on citation or bail, or moved by CCPD personnel to Airport Court or the Clara Shortridge Foltz Courthouse. Also, prisoners are transported directly to Los Angeles County Sheriff Department's (LASD) Inmate Reception Center and other facilities as necessary.

If remanded, CCPD prisoners are transferred to the custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. If a prisoner is not remanded and ordered released from custody, the LASD releases the prisoner from custody at Airport Courthouse. In the case of an order for release from the Clara Shortridge Foltz Courthouse, the CCPD jailer (or detective) who remained at the courthouse during court proceedings is required to escort the arrestee from the jail holding area to the main lobby of the court for release, unless there is an additional reason the arrestee is to remain incarcerated.

Security

CCPD's police facility was built in 1966 and underwent a partial renovation in 1999. The jail facility occupies 4,000 square feet of the police building. The jail has nine cells with a total of 30 beds configured in the following manner: three male holding cells (19 beds), two female holding cells (10 beds), one single cell (1 bed), one holding cell, one booking cell, and one sobering cell. The average inmate daily population in 2019 was 6.06 prisoners.

The jail's physical plant is relatively good for a nearly 70-year-old facility. Larger system components such as electrical, plumbing, air conditioning, and heating are dependent on the entire building and beyond the scope of this assessment. A private company completes the daily cleaning requirements of the facility. Any required maintenance or repair is completed by the Culver City Public Works Department.

During a jail tour by CPSM staff, security vulnerabilities noted below were identified and should be addressed expeditiously.

- A private cleaning vendor provides cleaning services for the police facility including the jail. The vendor is in possession of facility keys including the jail entrance door and various other doors in the station. With these keys, unescorted cleaning staff are able to enter the jail and traverse the secure area at will without CCPD supervision. This type of access unnecessarily threatens the safety of CCPD personnel through access to secure areas by unauthorized persons, the introduction of contraband such as weapons, drugs, etc., potential prisoner escape, and improper interaction between vendor staff and prisoners. Property drawers in the booking area which contain prisoner valuables (money, jewelry, etc.) are also accessible to the vendor staff.
- Jailers have a jail key block in their possession as part of their regular duties. These keys provide ingress and egress to various areas of the jail. Some keys in the jailer's possession allow exit of the jail to the station parking lot and interior station hallways. Should a prisoner overcome a jailer and obtain the jail keys, immediate escape through exterior exit doors is possible. Concerned staff should be convened to determine the best security versus workflow process to eliminate the present security issues. At a minimum, keys to exterior hard doors should be stored outside of the jail's secure area until needed. Interior doors to the other station areas could utilize a combination of access card and key code locks. The interior door to Records should be secured and not used except in emergencies. When resolved, security procedures should be documented in jail policy.

- Solo jail staff regularly move prisoners within the jail without prior notification to CCPD staff, which creates a potential safety and security issue, especially in the more remote areas of the jail. A second staff member should be present in the police facility and made aware of the pending movement or other activity before opening the prisoner's cell door to enhance staff safety. Except in emergencies, prisoner movement should not be allowed when additional staff is not present and available in the police facility.
- Recalcitrant and/or violent prisoners held in the CCPD jail can be an increased threat to jail staff. Movement of a recalcitrant or known violent prisoner should require the presence of a supervisor and adequate staff before opening the prisoner's cell door for movement or other activity.

Staffing

Jail personnel are charged with responsibility for the safety and welfare of inmates placed in the department's custody and for ensuring the minimum jail standards established by law are provided for each inmate. The CCPD jail administrator is the chief of police, the jail manager position is a Patrol lieutenant who was appointed in July 2020, and the jail supervisor is a Patrol sergeant who was appointed in January 2020.

The current civilian jail staff consists of a senior jailer and two jailers. Prior staffing included four jailers, but one position was eliminated in the 2020–2021 fiscal year budget. CCPD staff are scheduled as delineated in the following table. The three jailers are on a 3/13 schedule with an hour non-paid lunch. Two jailers work Monday-Wednesday and one jailer works Thursday-Saturday. Each jailer works every other Sunday. Some staff overlap does occur throughout the weekly schedule. As scheduled, there are approximately 45 hours weekly without jailer staff assigned for total of approximately 180 hours per month.

TABLE 4-20: Jail Staff Shift Schedule

Week One							
Jailer	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
Jailer 1	0400-1700	0400-1700	0400-1700	OFF	OFF	OFF	0500-1400*
Jailer 2	1600-0500	1600-0500	1600-0500	OFF	OFF	OFF	1700-0200*
Jailer 3	OFF	OFF	OFF	0400-1700	0400-1700	0400-1700	OFF

Week Two							
Jailer	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
Jailer 1	0400-1700	0400-1700	0400-1700	OFF	OFF	OFF	OFF
Jailer 2	1600-0500	1600-0500	1600-0500	OFF	OFF	OFF	OFF
Jailer 3	OFF	OFF	OFF	0400-1700	0400-1700	0400-1700	1700-0200*

*Works every other Sunday.

California Code of Regulations (CCR) Title 15, Minimum Jail Standards, dictate standards and requirements for jail operations. Among these standards staffing and training are outlined.

Section 1020, Corrections Officer Core Course, states: "In addition to the provisions of California Penal Code Section 831.5, all custodial personnel of a Type I, II, III, or IV facility shall successfully

complete the "Corrections Officer Core Course" as described in Section 179 of Title 15, CCR, within one year from the date of assignment. (b) Custodial Personnel who have successfully completed the course of instruction required by Penal Code Section 832.3 shall also successfully complete the "Corrections Officer Basic Academy Supplemental Core Course" as described in Section 180 of Title 15, CCR, within one year from the date of assignment."

Section 1027, Number of Personnel, states: "Whenever there is an inmate in custody, there shall be at least one employee on duty at all times in a local detention facility or in the building which houses a local detention facility who shall be immediately available and accessible to inmates in the event of an emergency. Such an employee shall not have any other duties which would conflict with the supervision and care of inmates in the event of an emergency. Whenever one or more female inmates are in custody, there shall be at least one female employee who shall be immediately available and accessible to such females." Even with proper training, if the designated employees' first priority in an emergency is not prisoners in-custody, they do not meet the "no other duties" criteria noted.

In addition, Section 1028, Fire and Life Safety Staff, states: "Whenever there is an inmate in custody, there shall be at least one person on duty at all times who meets the training standards established by the Board for general fire and life safety. The facility manager shall ensure that there is at least one person on duty who is trained in fire and life safety procedures that relate specifically to the jail facility."

To compensate for the jail staffing shortages, CCPD tasks available employees in the station (records clerk, desk officer, watch commander) who lack the required jail-related training to complete minimal duties of the jailer, primarily prisoner safety checks. Jailer overtime has been recently authorized to address some of the staffing shortages. In the jailer's absence, Patrol personnel book prisoners, house the arrestee, and complete required documentation.

The current staffing of the jail facility is inadequate and CCPD's efforts noted above to compensate for the staffing shortages does not bring the jail operation into compliance with state regulations. Core training requirements, staff availability during emergencies, and female staff availability were indicated as deficiencies during annual Board of State and Community Corrections staff (BSCC) inspections over the past three years. CPSM recommends these deficiencies be corrected. Correction can be achieved by the addition of three FTE jailers or by obtaining the required CCR Title 15 core training for alternate staff as documented in the 2020 BSCC inspection. CPSM recommends adding the three FTE jailers to ensure ongoing compliance with CCR regulations, as assigning trained staff and/or female staff when required would be a continuing challenge.

Proper staffing levels also enable prisoner safety checks to be conducted at least every 60 minutes for general prisoners, every 30 minutes for prisoners held in the sobering cell, and every 15 minutes for suicidal prisoners. In addition, the watch commander is responsible for periodically and no less frequently than twice during each tour of duty for walking through and inspecting the jail facility. A safety check means a direct, visual observation by jail staff performed at random intervals within timeframes prescribed in CCR regulations to provide for the health and welfare of inmates. CCPD Policy 504.3 outlines the safety check requirement and provides appropriate guidance to staff including documentation of such checks.

A major area of concern in managing a temporary holding facility is the timing of the required face-to-face safety checks. Should an incident occur which involved loss of life or serious injury to a prisoner and it is found a failure to comply with required safety checks contributed to the incident, CCPD could face significant liability. CCPD staff must continue its diligence to maintain this compliance practice; time notations should be recorded at the actual time they occur.

CCPD utilizes cameras to assist in monitoring the jail environment. The recorded video would likely be examined to verify safety checks against the written document in the event of an incident and consistency could be a factor. Any safety checks or inspections by CCPD supervision or other entities should be noted on the jail safety check log. This video of limited areas of the jail can be monitored by station staff, but no audio monitoring is available.

Prisoner Transportation

Movement of prisoners from one place to another is a necessary component of the criminal justice system. Safely and securely transporting a prisoner to the correct location, on time, ensures the system complies with the prisoner's constitutional rights and protects the community by safeguarding the prisoner in transit. Transportation of prisoners to and from secure locations is the most vulnerable part of any custody system. Impenetrable structures with multilayer security and adequate staff provide deterrent to escape or assault.

Currently, CCPD's transportation is generally handled by a single unarmed civilian jailer in a marked CCPD jail van. In the case of a recalcitrant prisoner, an officer may assist the jailer or two officers will conduct the transport. Although the transport vehicle generally provides minimal confinement barriers, there are few impediments to a failure in staff diligence or attack from an outside collaborator. Whether one prisoner is being transported or a dozen, the proper staffing, equipment, and procedure protocols must be in place. Failure to ensure each segment is in place can result in escape and/or injury to staff, prisoners, and the community.

CPSM recommends a revised transport policy that requires prisoner transport by a police officer(s) or a combination of a police officer and a civilian jailer to enhance safety and security of transports. This will bring CCPD's transportation practices more in line with other local agencies. Exploring a private prisoner transportation contract or combining resources with neighboring jurisdiction to create a regional transportation network for their collective transportation needs is also an available option.

Operation of a jail facility exposes any government entity to significant issues of potential liability. Culver City and its police department must continually monitor the environment to ensure compliance with Title 15 minimum jail standards, especially for staff and prisoner safety.

Jail Recommendations:

- Address facility security issues that include cleaning staff jail access, jail key security, and reconfiguration of interior station jail access door locks. (Recommendation No. 34.)
- Revise prisoner movement policies to require a second staff member be present in the police facility and made aware of the pending movement. (Recommendation No. 35.)
- Revise policy to require the presence of a supervisor and adequate staff before movement of a recalcitrant or known violent prisoner. (Recommendation No. 36.)
- Bring jail staffing relative to core training requirements, staff availability during emergencies and female staff availability into compliance with state regulations by adding three FTE jailers to ensure ongoing compliance with CCR regulations, as assigning other trained staff and/or female staff when required would be a continuing challenge. (Recommendation No. 37.)
- Ensure jail safety checks are random within the timeframes prescribed in CCR regulations and that time notations on the jail logs denote the actual time the prisoner is checked. (Recommendation No. 38.)
- Revise the prisoner transport policy with three options to consider: require transport by a police officer(s) or a combination of a police officer and a civilian jailer; a private prisoner

transportation contract; or combine resources with neighboring cities to create a regional transportation network. (Recommendation No. 39.)

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

The South Bay Regional Public Communications Authority's (RCC 911) computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system serves as the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) for all Culver City police and fire/EMS calls. RCC is regional dispatch center operated by three owner agencies (Hawthorne PD, Gardena PD, and Manhattan Beach PD) and three contract agencies (Culver City PD, Hermosa Beach PD, and El Segundo PD) through a joint-powers agreement (JPA). CCPD joined the regional dispatch center approximately three years ago in order to improve dispatch services after conducting a cost-benefit analysis and determining it was cost-prohibitive to bring the department's dispatch center up to industry standards. With the RCC, each agency has its own primary dispatch frequency to handle calls for service for the respective department.

RCC conducts executive committee meetings monthly with city manager and fire and police chief groups to handle policy and funding oversight.

The JPA conducts Police and Fire Task Force monthly meetings with the police chief or his/her designee from each member agency, which the CCPD Traffic lieutenant typically attends. The committee meets regularly to establish policy and address concerns or issues, which is a best practice to ensure continual effective and efficient service delivery.

Often the first point of contact for a citizen seeking assistance, 911 operators play a significant role in setting the tone for the community's attitude toward the agency. The efficiency with which they collect information from callers and relay that information to responding personnel significantly impacts the safety of citizens, officers, and fire/EMS personnel alike. And for crimes in progress, their work substantially affects the chances of apprehending criminals. CCPD staff indicated RCC provides professional services to the Culver City community.

High-priority Calls

All police departments prioritize calls for service based upon the seriousness of the call. The highest priority calls are referred to as Priority E calls. While definitions of a Priority E call may vary from agency to agency, such calls should include those involving life safety and in-progress crimes. For such calls, citizens expect and demand that their police department be adequately staffed and prepared to respond in a timely fashion. While the data report contains considerable information concerning response times to all priorities of calls for service and should be reviewed in its entirety, here we will focus on the highest priority of calls for service. For this analysis, we utilized data from citizen-initiated calls for service.

The following table depicts the average response time to Priority E calls as well as all other calls (all other priorities). Data calculations are based on what is commonly practiced at law enforcement agencies. That is, a call taker receiving a call types the information into a call screen, electronically sends it to the dispatcher, and the call is broadcast and assigned to an officer to handle. The dispatch period is measured from the time of call receipt, ending when the dispatcher assigns an officer to that call. The travel period begins at the conclusion of the dispatch period and ends when the officer arrives at the scene of the call. The response time represents the combination of the dispatch and travel periods. This is the amount of time it takes from the initial call to an officer arriving on scene. The table reflects average response times by priority.